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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
RESTRICTIONS ON RESALE OF CHATTELS
In modern times when manufacturers must use more
diligence and exercise more ingenuity to stimulate sales
and increase business, they attempt, by many and various
methods unknown at common law, to insure the continuity
of sales of their products on the market. This they en-
deavor to do by imposing restrictions on the chattels when
sold to respective buyers as to how, where and at what
price the buyer may dispose of the chattel. Where the
manufacturers' or distributors' efforts by one device have
been frustrated, the same purpose has been sought by dif-
ferent means under different theories. Counsel, in the
courts, have contrived highly novel theories behind which
they have attempted to accomplish indirectly what they
could not accomplish directly.
At common law any restriction on alienation was held
in great disfavor.' Restrictions on alienation were upheld
in cases where the restraint was reasonable. But the
doctrine of Spencer's Case2 clearly shows the conservative
attitude of those courts in upholding any condition or re-
striction following the land into hands of persons having
no contractual relations with the original promisee. In
that case it was held that covenants to run with the land
must (1) touch and concern the land and (2) be in esse at
the time of the demise or the assigns to be bound expressly
mentioned.8 The similar, if not greater, conservatism at
common law on restrictions on the alienation of chattels
is likewise illustrated by the much-quoted words of Lord
Coke' where he says, "If a man be possessed of a horse or
any other chattel real or personal and give his whole in-
terest or property therein upon condition that the donee
or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void, be-
cause his whole interest and property is out of him so as
he hath no possibility of reverter; and it is is against trade
'Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2nd edition, 1895) sects. 27, 28.
23 Co. 29 (1583).
8Tiffany on Real Property (1903 edition) p. 115.
'Coke on Littleton, sect. 360.
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and traffic and bargaining and contracting between man
and man."
In a very elucidating article by Professor Chafee5
there is enumerated a list of the types of restrictions em-
ployed by distributors and manufacturers on their products.
These are:
(a) Restrictions on resale prices6-imposed mainly to
prevent price cutting.
(b) Territorial restrictions 7-imposed to assure deal-
ers in one territory of freedom from invasion by other
dealers.
(c) Restrictions on use'--imposed to increase profits
of the manufacturer by the sale of more new articles.
(d) Tying restrictions 9-imposed also to increase
profits by stipulations that the buyer will use the manu-
facturer's articles auxiliary to product sold.
Likewise Professor Chafee sets forth the methods of
attempting to bind sub-purchasers by restrictions. The
first method under this class is the sub-contract device.
That is when the seller requires the buyer to promise to
make an agreement on resale with the buyer's purchaser
of the same nature that seller makes with the purchaser
that the condition imposed by the original seller will be per-
formed. The original seller attempts to enforce such agree-
ments by suing a sub-purchaser as a third party bene-
ficiary.
54lHarvard Law Review 945.
6Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339 (1908); Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. Park, 220 U. S. 373 (1911); Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229
U. S. 1, 50 L.. R. A. (N.S.) 1185 (1913); Straus v. Victor Talking
Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490 (1917); U. S. v. Schrader's Son, 252 U.
S. 85 (1920), indictment under Sherman Anti-Trust Act. A principal
may of course fix the price at which goods may be sold by his agent
for sale on commission. Walsh v. Dwight, 58 N. Y. S. 91 (1899)
Whitney v. Biggs, 156 N. Y. S. 1107 (1915).
7158 A. (N. J.) 736 (1932); 25 Ill. App. 516, 520.
8Elijah v. Mottinger, 161 Iowa 371, 142 N. W. 1038 (1913); Garst
v. Hall, 179 Mass. 588, 61 N. E. 219, 55 L. R. A. 631 (1901).
PStraus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U, S. 490 (1917).
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This method is rarely successful, however, since many
jurisdictions do not permit beneficiaries to maintain suits."o
Professor Chafee quite justly criticizes the technicality of
the rule that beneficiaries of contracts ordinarily cannot sue
to enforce them. However this may be, in many instances
the defense of the sub-purchaser that there is no consider-
ation moving from the promisee in an action by the orig-
inal seller to enforce the restriction against him is upheld.
Furthermore it seems the courts will determine the true
status of the middleman despite the fact he is described in
the contract as an agent. 1
The second is the notice or equitable servitude device.
The seller imposing the restriction places a notice on the
chattel specifying that the restriction is to bind all later
owners. By this method any subsequent purchaser is one
with notice. Professor Chafee says of this method,
"After Tulk v. Moxhay"2 a broad principle, amply sufficient
to give the desired enforcement of restrictions on chattels,
was announced by Lord Justice Knight Bruce in De Mattos
v. Gibson" :-'Reason and justice seem to prescribe that, at
least as a general rule, where a man, by gift or purchase,
acquires property from another, with knowledge of a prev-
ious contract, lawfully and for valuable consideration
made by him with a third person, to use and employ the
property for a particular purpose in a specified manner, the
acquirer shall not, to the material damage of the third
person, in opposition to the contract and inconsistently
with it, use and employ the property in a manner not
allowable to the giver or seller. This rule, applicable alike
in general, as I conceive, to movable and immovable prop-
erty, and recognized and adopted, as I apprehend, by the
English law, may, like other general rules, be liable to
exceptions arising from special circumstances'."
'o13 C. J. 703, note 88.
"1Dunlop Pneumatic Tire Co. v. Selfridge (1915) A. C. 847, II
Stephen's Comment on Laws of Eng. 212.
122 Ph. 774 (1848).
184 DeG. H. & J. 276, 282 (1858).
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In Werderman v. Societe Generate d' Electrecite," Sir
George Jessel permitted the enforcement of a restriction
against a sub-purchaser who took with notice. "The new
conception suggested by these two cases was simple and
practical. The analogy of restrictions on the use of land
after its sale could be extended to personal property so as
to enable the manufacturer or original seller to assert an
interest in the chattel, patent, or other personalty as
against any subsequent owner other that a bona fide pur-
chaser for value without notice."'15
Clark, however, in his treatise on Equity, says,-
"Where neither statutory nor natural monopoly is involved
the public interest in free trade in chattels would a fortiori
prevent the upholding of such restrictions."'5
Other means to enforce legally these restrictions have
been attempted.' The doctrine of Lumley v. Gye'8 has also
been invoked by sellers to enforce these restrictive agree-
ments. The doctrine of equitable servitudes on land was
first announced in the case of Tulk v. Moxhay' 9 and from
this arose the doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels.
Lumley v. Gye, which created the tort of inducing a party
to a contract to breach it was decided about five years
after Tulk v. Moxhay3° On the theory of Lumley v. Gye,
where A sells a chattel to B with the agreement that the
chattel is not to be resold under a certain price and C is
about to become the beneficiary of B's breach, "the receipt
of the chattel by C would be regarded as a tort to A, the
promisee, and it would not be necessary to create an
equitable servitude in the chattel in order to bind C, for he
would be liable to an injunction by the victim of his wrong
on tort principles, the remedy at law being inadequate.
Where later sub-purchasers are involved, the only way to
reach them under Lumley v. Gye would be to work out a
1419 Ch. D. 246 (1881).
15Chafee, 41 H. L. R. 945, 954.
16Clark on Equity 135.
17204 Ala. 566, 86 So. 880 (1920).
182 E. and B. 216 (1853).
lO2Ph. 774 (1848).
2OSee Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (1923),
270
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still more artificial system of implied promises by B that
he would bind C to exact from D a similar promise to
maintain the restrictions, and so on down the line. ' 21 Such
a theory as set forth here is hardly likely to receive sup-
port by the courts because it assumes too much and courts
are generally loathe to imply stipulations where they could
have been expressed.
Many states require more than mere knowledge by
the defendant of the existing contract before they will
enjoin him. Some courts require in addition to knowledge,
malice, force, threat of force or fraud.
22
In a very recent Pennsylvania case2 a buyer con-
tracted to sell the plaintiff's ice cream exclusively. The
plaintiff provided a storage cabinet and containers for the
buyer in which to preserve the ice cream. The defendant,
knowing of the buyer's contract with the plaintiff, sold him
ice cream at a lower price which the buyer resold. The
Supreme Court refused to enjoin the defendant from sell-
ing the ice cream to the buyer although it enjoined the
defendant from using the plaintiff's equipment.
The decision in this case has been commented on in a
student note in a recent volume of the Harvard Law
Review. 24 In that note it is suggested that an injunction
by the court could have been supported by invoking the
doctrine of Lumley v. Gye. Nowhere in the opinion is there
any mention of Lumley v. Gye but the case is a complete
repudiation of the doctrine for the court refused to enjoin
the defendant from inducing or causing the plaintiff's buy-
er to breach his contract with the plaintiff without some
other circumstances being present, such as fraud, duress or
intimidation. The original holding in Lumley v. Gye was
that the court will enjoin a defendant from inducing a
2'Chafee, 41 H. L. R. 945, 970, 974.
22See 41 H. L. R. 764-768. O'Neil v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 236 (1897)
intimidation; Flaccus v. Smith, 199 Pa. 128 (1900) enticement; Kraem-
er Hosiery Co. v. Am. Fed. of F. F. H. W. 305 Pa, 206 (1931); Jonas
Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n., 77 N. J, E. 219, 79 A. 262 (1911)-
coercion.
23159 A. 3 (1932).
2445 H. L. R. 940.
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party to a contract with the plaintiff to breach his contract
with the plaintiff regardless of these other circumstances.
This is an additional reason for believing that equit-
able servitudes on chattels would not be sustained in
Pennsylvania on the Luntley v. Gye theory.
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park, Etc.,25 where a price
restriction agreement directed toward the maintenance of
the price of certain proprietary medicines was held invalid,
Mr. Justice Holmes, characteristically regarding economic
ratiocinations, said in a dissenting opinion, "What then
is the ground upon which we interfere in the present
cause? Of course it is not the interest of the producer.
No one, I judge, cares for that. It hardly can be the in-
terest of subordinate vendors, as there seems to be no
particular reason for preferring them to the originator and
first vendor of the product. Perhaps it may be assumed
to be the interest of the consumers and the public****. I
think that we greatly exaggerate the value and the im-
porlance to the public of competition in the production or
distribution of an article****as fixing a fair price****. The
Dr. Miles Medical Co. knows better than we do what will
enable it to do the best business. We must assume its
retail price to be reasonable, for it so alleged and the case
is here on demurrer; so I see nothing to warrant my as-
suming that the public will not be served best by the com-
pany being allowed to carry out its plan. . I cannot believe
that in the long run the public will profit by this court
permitting knaves to cut reasonable prices for some
ulterior purpose of their own and thus to impair if not
destroy, the production and sale of articles which it is
assumed to be desirable that the public should be able to
get."
With all the foregoing authorities in mind and especi-
ally the very comprehensive work of Professor Chafee26 a
very late case in New Jersey decided that equitable servi-
tudes do not run with chattels on any theory.27 There the
25220 U. S. 373, 31 S. Ct. Rep. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502 (1911).
2641 H. L. R. 945.
27National Skee-Ball Co. v. Seyfried, 158 A. 736 (1932).
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complainant, a manufacturer of an amusement device
known as a skee-ball alley sold two of them to Philps, who
agreed in writing to use them in "Trenton, New Jersey,
or in any other part of the United States, providing there
are no skee-ball alleys in operation or licensed for use at
said place at time of removal." The contract described
Philps as a licensee and provided that if the terms of the
contract were violated the licensor could revoke and term-
inate on writterl notice "to the licensee or assignee there-
of, their heirs, executors, administrators, successor or
assigns." Philps did not himself violate any terms of the
contract. Later he sold the alleys to the defendant who
had notice of, the agreement. The defendant removed the
alleys to a certain territory and began business there a few
days after he had been informed that the complainant had
sold six alleys to another party under an agreement that
the other party should have the exclusive right to operate
in that territory. The complainant at first charged viola-
tion of patent rights, but later this charge was withdrawn.
The court held, "There was no privity of contract either
direct or by way of assignment between the complainant
and the defendant****."
"Counsel have not cited, and my own research has not
revealed, a single case in this state or elsewhere in which
the courts have favored the attachment of equitable servi-
tudes on chattels, title to which passes with delivery. The
absence of precedent alone, however, would not deter me
from granting relief if I were convinced that relief should
be granted."
"While an agreement between the seller and the pur-
chaser of personalty limiting its use to a certain locality
may be valid as between the immediate parties, I am not
ready to hold that such a covenant runs with the property.
The trend of judicial action is opposed to limitations and
restrictions on the alienability of personal property."
The court cites two instances where the rule has been
relaxed in New Jersey and in other jurisdictions. (1) In
connection with a sale of a business where covenants, of
the vender to refrain from competing with his vendee and
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his assigns have been held to run with the business to a
subsequent purchaser thereof.28  Such restraints must
meet the test of reasonableness. 29 (2) Contract made by
an employee not to solicit orders within a specified time
after the termination of his employment, passes without
specific reference thereto, with a sale of the business by
the employer.30 This exception is also subject to the test
of reasonableness.31
The courts seem to be unwilling to uphold restrictions
on chattels even though patented, 2 copyrighted,33 or trade-
marked.3'
In New Jersey restrictions as to price cutting on
chattels bearing trade-marks are upheld by statute. 5 The
fact that such a statute has been enacted in New Jersey
tends to strengthen the decision in the Skee-Ball Case. This
statute shows the policy of New Jersey to favor protecting
manufacturers and distributors so far as permitting them
to regulate price more than most jurisdictions. Despite
the policy as show by this statute the court in the Skee-
Ball Case refused to allow the seller to impose any terri-
torial restrictions on the chattel.
2BLangberg v. Wagner, 101 N. J. E. 383, 139 A, 518 (1927).
2913 C. J. 473 and cases cited in note 73; Monongahela Co. v.
Jutte, 210 Pa. 288 (1904) p Norris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co.,
68 Pa. 173 (1871); Kieler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467 (1866).
B0A. Fink & Sons v. Goldberg, 101 N. J. E. 644, 139 A. 408 (1927).
311 Legal Gaz. (Pa.) 79; Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 73
N. J. E. 684, 69 A. 186 (1908); Kieler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467 (1866);
Mandemani v. Hartman, 42 N. J. E. 185, 7 A. 37 (1886). Held these
contracts must be ancillary and incidental to another contract or sale.
Gompers v. Rochester, 56 Pa. 194 (1867).
82 Straus v. Victor Talking Mach .Co., 243 U. S. 490, L. R. A. 1917
E, 1196 (1917); Boston Store v. American Gramophone Co., 246 U.
S. 8 (1918); U. S. v Schrader's Son, 252 U. S. 85 (1920).
3 3Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339 (1908); Erskine
McDonald v. Eyles, 1 K. B. 121 (1921).
84Appollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 Fed. 18 (1886). But see Bour-
jois v. Katzel, 269 U. S. 689 (1923) as to territorial restrictions. 7 A. L.
R. 449.
4*35P. L. 1816, c. 107. Ingersoll Bros. v. Haline, 88 N. J, E, 222, 101
A. 1030 (1917).
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Apparently the Pennsylvania courts have not had oc-
casion to take a definite stand in interpreting the policy of
this state toward the attachment of equitable servitudes to
chattels. However in the case of Garst v. Wissler"6 it ap-
peared that the plaintiff, a manufacturer of pills, printed
upon the boxes containing the pills, the following notice:
"Important notice-This box of Phenyo-Caffein is sold to
be consumed only, and the title continues in the Phenyo-
Caffein Co. to prohibit a sale thereof by any purchaser at
retail, except that it may be resold for not less than
twenty-five cents per box or five boxes for one dollar. The
acceptance of this box by any person is assent to this con-
dition of, and a direct agreement with the Phenyo-Caffein
Co. that for each violation, the possession of the box may
be recovered and the party selling will pay the said Com-
pany twenty-one dollars as liquidated damages the said
Company will suffer by said violation." The plaintiff re-
quired his customers to sign a contract to the effect that in
consideration of a deduction from the full retail price, they
would not sell for less than the price named in the notice.
The defendant refused to negotiate with the plaintiff, and
purchased plaintiff's pills from another druggist with
whom he made no agreement and from whom he received
no notice of the matters contained in the contract. De-
fendant, however, knew the terms of the contract. The
plaintiff sued to recover from the defendant twenty-one
dollars as liquidated damages as seb forth in the contract.
The theory of the plaintiff was that there was an implied
contract which arose when defendant bought the pills.
The court denied that any contract arose between the
parties and refused to permit the plaintiff to recover. The
court said by way of dicta," "The plaintiff has the un-
doubted right to control the selling price of his proprietary
article by a contract with him, but to hold that the in-
diyidual purchaser is bound by the terms printed on the
box of pills, and is liable for liquidated damages the
amount being determined by the plaintiff while at the same
3621 Pa. Super. Ct. 532 (1902).
8?Id. p. 536.
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time the title continues in the plaintiff, is a longer step
than we are willing to take."
The court cites and quotes from Garst v. Hall and Lyon
Co., a Massachusetts case similar in facts, 8 "the plaintiff's
right was founded on personal contract alone, and can be
enforced only against the contracting party. To say that
the contract is attached to the property and follows it
through successive sales which severally pass the title, is
a very different proposition. '"3 9
According to Professor Chafee'0 although numerous
eminent authorities and courts have held that such restric-
tions on chattels are inconsistent with the right of free
alienation, not one has promulgated a really convincing
reason for holding them inconsistent. It is not the inten-
tion of the writer herein to express his opinion as to the
propriety of the general rule and its exceptions but merely
to state as a conclusion that whatever may be its merits,
the general rule throughout the United States and England
is that equitable servitudes do not attach to chattels as they
do to land.
Herbert Horn
RIGHT TO RECLAIM DELIVERED GOODS IN A
CASH SALE
The term "cash sale" as applied to a sale of specific
goods has been used by the courts in two different senses.
It is sometimes used to denote a sale where title is not to
pass until the cash is paid and sometimes to denote a sale
where title has passed but possession is not to be delivered
until payment is made. When used in the latter sense, the
title passes at once upon the completion of the contract
by the force of it, so as to cast the risk upon the buyer and
entitle the seller to the price. However, the buyer, though
he has title, is not entitled to possession until he pays the
3861 N. E. 219, 179 Mass. 588, 55i L. R. A. 631 (1901).
89See 7 A. L. R. 443 and note.
6041 H. L. R. 945, at p. 982.
